Iraqi Police and Stabilizing Iraq
by Jim Kouri, CPP
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired
end-state for US operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure
Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full
partner in the global war on terrorism.
Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in US
efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States
has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces.
The Department of Defense has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion
in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008
Global War on Terror budget request to continue US efforts to develop Iraq
forces and transition security responsibilities to them.
This article is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on US
efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although they reviewed both classified and
unclassified documents, the information in this article is based only on
unclassified documents.
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped
327,000 Iraqi security forces -- a substantial increase from the 142,000
reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of
the 153,000-strong US-led coalition currently in Iraq.
While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to
reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per
day had increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in
December 2006.
Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security
forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces
has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a
single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency
in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary
mission of counterinsurgency -- specifically, the Iraqi army.
The other major component -- the Iraqi police -- has civilian law
enforcement as its primary mission.
Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in
an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for
duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports
on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many
coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the
180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and
equipped.
Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and
the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr
Organization and Mahdi Army.
According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian
divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units.
Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the
coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities.
As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of
support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The
extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed
information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this
information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not
provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information
on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and
training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational
effectiveness.
Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National
Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media
Alliance (thenma.org). He's former chief at a New York City housing
project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering
the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public
safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several
major organizations. He's also served on the National Drug Task Force
and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri
writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police,
Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for
TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He's also a columnist for
AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by
AXcessNews.Com. He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and
radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN
Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at
Amazon.Com. Kouri's own website is located at http://jimkouri.us
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Radicalize this!
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired
end-state for US operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure
Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full
partner in the global war on terrorism.
Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in US
efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States
has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces.
The Department of Defense has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion
in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008
Global War on Terror budget request to continue US efforts to develop Iraq
forces and transition security responsibilities to them.
This article is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on US
efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although they reviewed both classified and
unclassified documents, the information in this article is based only on
unclassified documents.
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped
327,000 Iraqi security forces -- a substantial increase from the 142,000
reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of
the 153,000-strong US-led coalition currently in Iraq.
While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to
reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per
day had increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in
December 2006.
Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security
forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces
has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a
single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency
in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary
mission of counterinsurgency -- specifically, the Iraqi army.
The other major component -- the Iraqi police -- has civilian law
enforcement as its primary mission.
Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in
an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for
duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports
on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many
coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the
180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and
equipped.
Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and
the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr
Organization and Mahdi Army.
According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian
divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units.
Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the
coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities.
As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of
support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The
extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed
information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this
information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not
provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information
on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and
training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational
effectiveness.
Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National
Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media
Alliance (thenma.org). He's former chief at a New York City housing
project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering
the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public
safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several
major organizations. He's also served on the National Drug Task Force
and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri
writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police,
Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for
TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He's also a columnist for
AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by
AXcessNews.Com. He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and
radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN
Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at
Amazon.Com. Kouri's own website is located at http://jimkouri.us
Labels: Iraq
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Radicalize this!
